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Abstract
The certified question and the legal impact of the Court of Justice’s preliminary ruling on that
question are the subject of this Comment. Part I explains the relevant provisions of the Hague
Abduction Convention, Brussels II bis, and the implicated European human rights laws, and dis-
cusses the case in chief before the Irish High and Supreme Courts. Part II examines the Court of
Justice’s opinion on the certified question. Finally, Part III analyzes the impact of the opinion on
J.McB. and his family, Brussels II bis and its interpretation, and the jurisprudence the Court of
Justice regarding the protection of family life.
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INTRODUCTION
L.E., a thirty-one-year-old woman, left Ireland in July 2009
with her three children and relocated to her childhood home in
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England.' J.McB., the thirty-four-year-old father of these three
children, was left behind with no knowledge of their
whereabouts.2 Prior to her abrupt departure from Ireland, L.E.
had been in an eleven-year relationship with J.McB., and at one
point was engaged to be married to him.3 J.McB. searched for his
family, eventually locating them in England.4 In November 2009,
he began legal proceedings to have his children returned to
Ireland.5 In these proceedings, J.McB. was confronted with an
abstruse legal problem: did Ireland or England have the
authority to decide what rights he had to his children?6 The
answer is crucial to his family because it determines which
country's laws will apply when determining the custody rights of
each parent and, therefore, which parent will be able to choose
the children's place of residence.7
As the case between J.McB. and L.E. demonstrates, the
answer to this simple question is surprisingly complex. For
twenty-seven years, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction ("Hague Abduction Convention"
or "Convention") has governed this legal conundrum.8 The
1. SeeJ.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, 3, 5, 11, 26 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2010/H123.html.
2. See id. 1 3, 26 (noting that in 2010, J.McB. had to "trace" his family after their
departure from Ireland).
3. Id. IT 3, 17.
4. See id. 26 (implying that J.McB. located his family in England in September
2009).
5. See id. 2, 26 (discussing the legal proceedings in England).
6. See Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 1, Oct.
25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Abduction
Convention] ("The objects of the present Convention are ... to ensure that rights of
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in
the other Contracting States."); see also ANNE-MARIE HUTCHINSON & HENRY SETRIGHT,
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION 4 (1998) (noting that the Hague
Abduction Convention enables courts in a child's traditional place of residence to
decide custody matters).
7. See HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that the Hague
Abduction Convention seeks to have the courts in the state where the child is habitually
resident decide custody matters); ELISA PtREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980
HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION 18 (1982), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/
indexen.php?act=publications.details&pid=2779 (noting that debates on custody
matters should take place in the state where the child is a habitual resident).
8. Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.net/index
en.php?act=conventions.statusandcid=24 (last updated Apr. 19, 2011) [hereinafter
Hague Conference Status Table] (stating the Hague Abduction Convention entered into
force December 12, 1983).
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Hague Abduction Convention facilitates one contracting state
promptly returning a child wrongfully removed from, or retained
in, another contracting state so that the first state may exercise
jurisdiction over custody matters.9 On March 1, 2005, however, a
European Union ("EU") regulation known as Brussels II bis
("Regulation") came into effect.'0 Designed to "complement"
the Hague Abduction Convention, the Regulation also governs
interstate child abductions." Because both share the founding
principle that the courts in the country where the child is
habitually resident12 are the most appropriately suited to decide
custody matters, the Hague Abduction Convention and Brussels
II bis work together in cases of intra-EU child abductions. 3
Additionally, the interplay of these two documents is influenced
by European human rights law,14 which affects the application of
all EU law.'5
The case between J.McB. and L.E. raised questions on the
manner in which Brussels II bis, the Hague Abduction
Convention, and European human rights law interact in intra-EU
child abductions. J.McB. v. L.E. is important because it is the first
9. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 28 (1999) (noting that securing the prompt return
of a child wrongfully removed or retained is an objective of the Hague Abduction
Convention); see also NIGEL LOWE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN: LAW
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 248 (2004) (noting that the Hague Abduction Convention
works by returning children who have been wrongfully removed or retained from their
state of habitual residence).
10. Council Regulation 2201/2003 Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental
Responsibility, 2003 O.J. L 388/1 [hereinafter Brussels II bis].
11. Id. pmbl., at 2 ("In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child, the return
of the child should be obtained without delay, and to this end the Hague Convention of
25 October 1980 would continue to apply as complemented by the provisions of this
Regulation .. . .").
12. "Habitual residence" is a flexible concept, used by the Conference to enable a
fact-sensitive decision on where a child or family resides. For a full discussion of the
term's use and history see BEAUMONT & MCELEAW, supra note 9, at 88-113.
13. See id. at 88 (stating that habitual residence is a primary consideration when
determining if a child should be sent to another contracting state); see also EUROPEAN
JUDICIAL NETWORK, PRACTICE GUIDE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW BRUSSELS II
REGULATION 12 (2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/parental-resp/
parental-resp-ecyvdm-en.pdf; id. at 28 (noting that all Member States of the EU are
contracting states to the Hague Abduction Convention).
14. For the purpose of this Comment, the term "European human rights law" will
include the human rights law of the EU, Council of Europe, and Irish domestic law.
15. See generally JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS 146-66 (2010) (discussing the general status of human rights law in Europe).
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case that addresses the question of whether an unmarried father
has automatic rights of custody for purposes of intra-EU child
abduction since the EU's principal human rights document-the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
("Charter")-became binding in 2009 with the passage of the
Lisbon Treaty.16 Because he filed his case in Ireland merely
twenty-two days after the Charter became binding,17 J.McB. had
the opportunity to make the innovative argument that Ireland
was compelled to recognize that a father who is not married to
the mother of his children can compel the return of his children
to Ireland under Brussels II bis and thus under the Hague
Abduction Convention.18
J.McB. originally filed suit in England, asking the English
court to order his children returned to Ireland so that the Irish
courts could determine his rights of guardianship and custody. 9
Unfortunately, the case involved a number of complicated legal
questions that were not easily resolvable.20 As this Comment
explains, the English court requested that J.McB. bring another
suit in the High Court of Ireland to determine the status of his
custody rights under Irish law.2 ' The High Court determined that
J.McB. did not have rights in Irish law that would enable him to
compel his children's return to Ireland. J.McB. appealed the
16. See PIRIS, supra note 15, at 159 ("[T]he Charter of Fundamental Rights has
become legally binding upon the EU institutions and upon Member States when they
are implementing Union law."); see also RAYMOND BYRNE & PAUL MCCUTCHEON, THE
IRISH LEGAL SYSTEM 748 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that ratification of the Lisbon Treaty
would elevate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ("Charter") to
the status of the treaties).
17. See PIRIS, supra note 15, at 7-70 (noting that the Charter was made binding by
the Lisbon Treaty and discussing the series of treaties establishing and refining the
European Union ("EU") as it is today).
18. SeeJ.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, it 21-22 (Ir.) (outlining J.McB's argument
before the Irish Supreme Court); J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, 1 2 (H. Ct.) (Ir.);
PIRIS, supra note 15, at 63 (noting the Lisbon Treaty became effective December 1,
2009); see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] ("Everyone has the
right to respect for his private and family life."); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union art. 7, 2010 O.J. C 83/389, at 393 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]
("Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life.").
19. jMcB., [2010] IESC, 1 6.
20. See supra notes 15-18 (explaining that the legal landscape for human rights in
the EU was altered by the coming into effect of the Lisbon Treaty and that the rights of
unmarried fathers had not been judicially tested).
21. jMcB., [2010] IESC, 1 7.
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High Court's decision to the Irish Supreme Court.22 The
Supreme Court required an interpretation of both Brussels II bis
and the Charter's protection of family life before it could decide
whether, for the purposes of an intra-EU child abduction, a
father who is not married to the mother of his children has
automatic rights of custody that enable him to compel the court
in the Member State in which his children had been taken to
return the children to their resident Member State.23 The
Supreme Court, therefore, certified a question to the Court of
Justice of the European Union asking whether the Charter
required Ireland to recognize such rights of custody for
unmarried fathers. 24
The certified question and the legal impact of the Court of
Justice's preliminary ruling on that question are the subject of
this Comment. Part I explains the relevant provisions of the
Hague Abduction Convention, Brussels II bis, and the implicated
European human rights laws, and discusses the case in chief
before the Irish High and Supreme Courts. Part II examines the
Court of Justice's opinion on the certified question. Finally, Part
III analyzes the impact of the opinion on J.McB. and his family,
Brussels II bis and its interpretation, and the jurisprudence the
Court ofJustice regarding the protection of family life.
I. THE LEGAL BACKDROP
In order to better understand the legal framework within
which the Court ofJustice opined, this Part introduces the Hague
Abduction Convention and Brussels II bis and uses cases to
illustrate the operation of the Hague Abduction Convention and
the Regulation. Section A presents the Hague Abduction
Convention, demonstrating the treaty's relevance by discussing
Irish case law on the Convention and custody rights. Section B
reviews the development of the Regulation and explains how it
interacts with the Hague Abduction Convention. Section C
explains the relationship of European human rights law to child
abductions by one parent when the parents are not married.
Finally, Section D outlines the arguments of both J.McB. and L.E
22. Id. 1 10.
23. Id. If 39-42 (outlining the legal issues on which the court required
clarification).
24. Id. If 42-44.
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before the Irish High Court and Supreme Court, thereby
explaining why a determination by the Court of Justice was
required.
A. The Hague Convention
In the 1970s, the newfound ease of global travel and the
resulting number of multinational marriages brought
international child abduction to the forefront of private
international law.25 Responding to this concern, the topic was
added to the agenda of the Fourteenth Session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law ("Conference").26 After
noting that many international abductions followed similar
patterns, the Conference developed the Hague Abduction
Convention.27
The Conference rejected the traditional provision of
international cooperation: having countries recognize and
enforce each other's judgments.28 Instead, the Conference
focused on returning the child to her place of habitual residence
for the courts in that state to handle the matter entirely.29
Preferring to facilitate administrative cooperation rather than
25. See BEAUMONT & McELEAW, supra note 9, at 2 (citing an increase in individual
mobility and international marriages as factors contributing to international child
abductions); Lawrence N. Stotter, Hisotry, in INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A
GUIDE TO APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITH FORMS 9 (Gloria F. DeHart ed., 2d
ed. 1993) (noting that international child abductions were prevalent worldwide); see also
id. at 9 n.23 (discussing the history of Hague Conferences on private international law).
26. See Stotter, supra note 25, at 11 (noting that discussions on the Hague
Abduction Convention were held from October 6-24, 1980, and that the Conference
voted on October 25, 1980); PEREZ-VERA, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that the Fourteenth
Session on the Hague Conference on Private International Law ("Conference") was
held from October 6-25, 1980); see also BEAUMONT & McELEAW, supra note 9, at 3
(discussing problems created by international child abductions such as drawn out court
proceedings); Stotter, supra note 25, at 9 (crediting the Canadian expert, Mr. T.
Bradbrooke, as the first to raise the issue at the Hague Conference in 1976).
27. See BEAUMONT & McELAW, supra note 9, at 3 (listing discovery, cost, and
investigations into the best interests of the child as characteristic problems); Stotter,
supra note 25, at 9 (discussing patterns in child abduction).
28. See HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that the Hague
Abduction Convention was not designed to enforce custody decisions); Stotter, supra
note 25, at 9-11 (noting that the drafters chose to omit provisions on recognition and
enforcement).
29. Stotter, supra note 25, at 9-11 (noting that the drafters focused on returning
the child to her habitual place of residence); PEREZ-VERA, supra note 7, at 23 (noting
that the Hague Abduction Convention is not a treaty on recognition and enforcement of
judgments).
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asking states to recognize another state's judicial determination,
the Conference sought the speedy return of the child.30
Requiring the prompt return of the child also prevents the child
from becoming too integrated into her new environment,
another goal of the Convention.31
Today, the Hague Abduction Convention is widely ratified,
and the forty-five states that responded to the Conference's 2003
survey handled 1259 Hague Abduction Convention
applications. 32 The number of applications, however, understates
the number of children involved both because a discrete number
of contracting states responded to the survey and because
multiple children can be named in a single application.33 Of
these applications, eighty-four percent requested the child be
returned to her place of habitual residence so that a court in that
state could exercise jurisdiction over the matter.54
30. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 9, at 22-23 (discussing the interests of
child as the exception to mandatory return); Stotter, supra note 25, at 10-11 ("The
thrust of the [Hague Abduction Convention] was to force the abductor to return the
child to its traditional place of residence for resolution of the issues in dispute between
parents. . . .").
31. Stotter, supra note 25, at 10 (noting that the drafters sought prompt return of
the child to avoid integration in a new environment); PtREZ-VERA, supra note 7, at 23
(citing the potential for abducted children to suffer psychological problems as the
reason to ensure prompt return of the child); see also Hague Abduction Convention,
supra note 6, pmbl. ("The States signatory to the present Convention, [flirmly
convinced that the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters
relating to their custody, [d]esiring to protect children internationally from the harmful
effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure
their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure
protection for rights of access, [h]ave resolved to conclude a Convention to this
effect. . . .").
32. See NIGEL LOWE ET AL., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003
UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 7 (2006) (noting that in 2003, forty-five contracting
states responded to the Hague Conference on Private International Law's survey); Hague
Conference Status Table, supra note 8 (stating that there are presently eighty-five
contracting states to the Hague Abduction Convention); see also BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 9, at 241-42 (observing that the Hague Abduction Convention is
successful when the contracting states comply with the cooperation requirements laid
out in the text).
33. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 32, at 7, 10-11 (noting that there were 1259
applications, and at least 2102 children affected). J.McB.'s request to the English Court
falls into this category. SeeJ.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, 6 (Ir.).
34. LOWE ET AL., supra note 32, at 84 (stating that eighty-four percent "of
applications made in 2003 under the 1980 Convention concerned return
applications.").
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By their nature, Convention applications will always involve,
at a minimum, two states35 : the state to which the alleged
abductor took the child and the state in which the other parent
or guardian resides. Under the Hague Abduction Convention,
every contracting state is required to set up a "Central Authority"
to "discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention."3 6
The non-abducting parent or guardian can apply to any
contracting state's Central Authority for assistance in obtaining a
child's return.37
When a Central Authority receives a Hague Abduction
Convention application, the judicial or administrative authority
in that state is obliged to return the child if it finds that the child
was wrongfully removed.38 A child is wrongfully removed if the
person making the application has custody rights under the
domestic law of the state of the child's habitual residence and was
actually exercising these rights at the time of removal.39 The
Convention provides a definition of "rights of custody" that the
applicant's custody rights under domestic law must also satisfy:
"'rights of custody' shall include rights relating to the care of the
person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the
35. See BEAUMONT & MCELFAw, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that the Hague
Abduction Convention is only concerned with international situations); HUTCHINSON &
SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 3 (defining international child abduction as a child moving
across an international border and noting that the Hague Abduction Convention
applies to these situations).
36. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 6, art. 6; see also BEAUMONT &
McELEAVY, supra note 9, at 228 (noting that the Hague Abduction Convention
deliberately omits particulars about structure and capacity of the Central Authorities,
causing "considerable diversity" in form, personnel, and resources from state to state).
37. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 6, art. 8 ("Any person, institution or
other body claiming that a child has been removed or retained in breach of custody
rights may apply either to the Central Authority of the child's habitual residence or to
the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the
return of the child.").
38. Id. art. 12 ("Where a child has been wrongfully removed ... the authority
concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith . . .. ").
39. Id. art. 3 ("The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful
where-a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any
other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and b) at the time of
removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or
would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. The rights of custody
mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by
reason of ajudicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal
effect under the law of that State.").
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child's place of residence."* This definition has an autonomous
meaning, that is, the definition stands on its own and is
independent of its usage in any contracting state's domestic law.4'
Additionally, under Convention Article 15, a Central Authority
that has received an application may request that the applicant
obtain a declaration from the child's state of habitual residence
that the child was wrongfully removed, thereby preventing a
contracting state from having to interpret another state's
domestic law in situations where the applicant's rights are
uncertain. 42
Analysis of Hague Abduction Convention applications is
solely within domestic law because the Hague Convention is not a
self-executing treaty.43 Therefore, whenever a parent or guardian
makes an application, she actually applies through that state's
domestic law."4 By nature of the Convention, the implementing
legislation works closely with domestic legislation on custody
rights because applications involve analyzing the applicant's
rights under a contracting state's law.45
In Ireland, the implementing legislation for the Hague
Convention is known as the Child Abduction and Enforcement
40. Id. art. 5.
41. See BEAUMONT & MCELFAVY, supra note 9, at 74 (noting that Hague Abduction
Convention custody rights have a semi-autonomous meaning); PREZ-VERA, supra note 7,
at 24 (discussing the autonomous nature of the Convention).
42. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 6, art. 15 ("The judicial or
administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order
for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the
State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the
removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention. .. ."); see also BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 9, at 63 (stating that
Article 15 should only be used in cases in which the applicant's rights are unclear
because of the delay in seeking such verification); LOWE ET AL., supra note 9, at 281
(noting that Article 15 allows a state to ask for clarification of another state's laws if the
law's application is uncertain).
43. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 6, art. 2 ("Contracting States shall
take all appropriate measures to secure within their territories the implementation of
the objects of the Convention.").
44. See, e.g., H.I. v. M.G., [2000] I.R 110, 132 (Ir.) (referencing Irish implementing
legislation of the Hague Abduction Convention); see also In re D., [2007] 1 A.C. 619
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
45. See PtREZ-VERA, supra note 7, at 24 ("The Convention must necessarily coexist
with the rules of each Contracting State on applicable law and on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign decrees. . . .").
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of Custody Orders Act.46 Further, the primary Irish legislation on
custody rights is the Guardianship of Infants Act,47 which was
amended by the Status of Children Act, and together these two
acts define custody rights in Irish domestic law.48 The
Guardianship of Infants Act, as amended, grants to the mother
sole custody rights of her children if she is not married to the
father.49 If the couple is married, however, the parents share
guardianship.50 Under Irish law, guardians have rights of custody
that satisfy the definition of "rights of custody" found in Article 3
of the Hague Abduction Convention.5' An unmarried father does
not have rights of custody automatically; he merely has a right to
apply for custody.52
46. Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991 (Act No.
6/1991) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1991/en/act/pub/0006/
print.html.
47. See HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 119; see also Guardianship of
Infants Act 1964 (Act No. 7/1964) (Ir.) available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
1964/en/act/pub/0007/print.html.
48. See HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 119 (noting that the
Guardianship of Infants Act, as amended by the Status of Children Act, is the primary
law on child custody in Ireland). See generally Status of Children Act 1987 (Act No.
26/1987) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1987/en/act/pub/0026/
print.html; Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 (Act No. 7/1964).
49. See Guardianship of Infants Act § 6(4). Section 6(4) has been amended by
Status of Children Act §§ 11-12 ("Where the mother of an infant has not married the
infant's father, she, while living, shall alone be the guardian of the infant. . . .").
50. Compare Guardianship of Infants Act § 6(1) ("The father and mother of an
infant shall be guardians of the infant jointly."), with id. § 6(4) ("The mother of an
illegitimate infant shall be guardian of the infant.").
51. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 6, art. 5 (defining rights of
custody for purposes of the Convention); G.T. v. K.A.O., [2007] 3 I.R. 567, 615 (Ir.)
(Murray, J.) (implicitly acknowledging that a mother who was not married to the father
of her children had rights satisfying the definition of rights of custody found in Article 3
of the Hague Abduction Convention).
52. See McD. v. L., [2009] IESC 81, 1 76 (Ir.) (Fennelly, J.) (summarizing relevant
precedent and concluding that a father who is not married to the mother of his child
does not have natural or constitutional rights to the child, and that section 6A of the
Guardianship of Infants Act merely granted a father the right to apply to be a guardian);
W.O'R. v. E.H., [1996] 2 I.R. 248, 269-70 (Ir.) (Hamilton, J.) (concluding that a father
who is not married to the mother of his children, but is in a long-term and stable
relationship, has extensive rights to his children, but those rights are not triggered until
he applies under the Guardianship of Infants Act); J.K v. V.W., [1992] I.R. 437, 446 (Ir.)
(Finlay, J.) ("Section 6A [of the Guardianship of Infants Act] ... does not give [an
unmarried father] a right to be guardian, and it does not equate his position vis-a-vis the
infant as a matter of law with the position of a father who is married to the mother of the
infant.").
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The Irish Supreme Court commented on the relationship
between the Convention and inchoate rights of custody in H.L v.
M.G.53 The plaintiff-father in that case, H.I., was an Egyptian
citizen.5 4 He met the defendant-mother, M.G., a citizen of Great
Britain, in the United States.55 The couple lived together for five
years, but never married under New York law.5 6 When the
couple's relationship deteriorated, M.G. applied for, and was
granted, temporary custody of their child by New York.57 She
then took the child to Ireland.58 The question before the Irish
Supreme Court was whether this removal was wrongful under the
Hague Abduction Convention.59 The applicant argued that
Article 3 of the Convention "ought to be interpreted as applying
to inchoate rights of custody .. . [g]iven that the objective of the
Hague Convention was to spare children the adverse effects
resulting from arbitrary removal." 0 The respondent submitted
that because the applicant was not the primary caregiver and had
neither sought nor had been granted any right of custody, he was
not entitled to compel the child's return to the United States. 61
The Irish Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the father
had no rights of custody that could satisfy the Convention.62
Thus, the precedent established in this case is that a father who is
not married to the mother of his children and has not obtained a
legally enforceable right of custody under Irish law does not have
rights of custody under the Hague Abduction Convention:
Ireland does not recognize a father's inchoate rights of custody.6 3
53. See H.I.v. M.G., [2000] I.R. 110, 132 (Ir.) (Keane,J.).
54. Id. at 113.
55. Id.
56. Id. (stating that the couple was married under Muslim law, but the marriage
was not valid in New York).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 114.
59. Id. at 117.
60. Id. at 121.
61. Id. ("She submitted that ... [she] was the primary carer and hence her action
in taking the child to Ireland was not a typical case of abduction . . . . [She] further
submitted that ... the plaintiff had neither sought nor been granted any right of
custody: he had confined his application to the court to access.").
62. Id. at 133-34 (concluding that the plaintiff did not have rights under New York
law that could prevent the removal of the child to Ireland). In coming to its conclusion,
the court commented that "the appropriate method of addressing difficulties of that
nature . . . is through the machinery of [the Conference] ... rather than by innovative
judicial responses." Id. at 133.
63. Id. at 133-34 (concluding and summarizing the opinion).
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B. Brussels II bis
Brussels II bis, like the Hague Abduction Convention, is an
international law, but only applies between EU Member States.64
Brussels 11 bis expands upon an earlier piece of EU legislation
regarding family law6 5 commonly known as Brussels II, which was
only in force from March 2001 to March 2005.66 Prior to its
enactment, the presumption was that family law lay outside the
EU's competence because it is value laden, culturally unique, and
outside the EU's economic objectives.67 That there was no
regulation of families prior to Brussels II is not, however,
completely true: as early as the 1960s there were laws that
provided free movement and residents' rights to migrant
worker's families, thereby helping to achieve economic
objectives. 68
The major expansion of the EU's competence in family law
came as a result of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, which gave it
the power to regulate cross-border recognition and enforcement
64. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, 2010 0.J. C 83/47, at 171 [hereinafter TFEU] ("A regulation shall have
general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States.").
65. See NIGEL LOWE ET AL., THE NEW BRUSSELS II REGULATION: A SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN 15 (2005) (noting that much of Brussels II bis
was taken from its predecessor); Peter McEleavy, Brussels II his: Matrimonial Matters,
Parental Responsibility, Child Abduction and Mutual Recognition, 53 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 503,
503 (2004) (stating that Brussels II bis is an expanded version of its predecessor, Brussels
II).
66. Council Regulation 1345/2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental
Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses, art. 46, 2000 O.J. L 160/19, at 29
[hereinafter Brussels II] (stating Brussels II came into force on March 1, 2001); Brussels
II bis, supra note 10, art. 72, at 19 (noting that Brussels II bis became effective on March
1, 2005, repealing Brussels II).
67. See CLARE MCGLYNN, FAMILIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: LAW, POLICIES AND
PLURALISM 165 (2006) (positing that family law arguably remains outside EU
competence because the legality of regulating families has to be derived from other
declared EU objectives such as greater European integration); Frederik Swennen,
Atypical Families in EU (Private International) Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 389, 390 Uohan Meeusen et al. eds., 2007) ("The [EU] has
no competence in family law ... because of its purely economic objectives.").
68. See MCGLYNN, supra note 67, at 46 (noting that from early on the European
Community granted families rights to facilitate movement of economic actors); Helen
Stalford, EU Family Law: A Human Rights Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW,
supra note 67, at 101, 107 (noting that many families still use these laws to move to
another Member State with their family member who is a migrant worker).
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of judicial judgments, including those involving family matters.69
Promulgated with a number of other measures following this
expansion in power, Brussels II's foray into family law was
uneventful, despite its potential for broad reaching effects in the
EU. 70 As evidenced by the drafting and implementation of
Brussels II, the EU realized that the free movement of people
necessitated a regulation on the recognition and enforcement of
marriages and divorces.71 Brussels II takes the stance that there
can be only one Member State with original jurisdiction over any
given action, and once jurisdiction is exercised, it cannot be
challenged in another Member State's courts.7 2 Brussels II
accomplishes this by applying strict theories of lis pendens and
prior temporis- if the same cause of action is filed in two Member
States, the state in which the matter was first filed has jurisdiction
to adjudicate the matter and the other state must not exercise
jurisdiction.73 Unlike the Hague Abduction Convention, both
Brussels II and Brussels II bis focus on the recognition and
69. Michael Bogdan, The EC Treaty and the Use of Nationality and Habitual Residence
as Connecting Factors in International Family Law, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW, supra
note 67, at 303-04 (noting that the Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Community
the power to regulate interjurisdictional recognition and enforcement of judgments).
See generally Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 O.J. C
340/1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
70. MCGLYNN, supra note 67, at 152 (noting that virtually no one realized EU law
had reached into family law because the focus was on other measures that were
promulgated concurrently); Peter McEleavy, Brussels II Regulation: How the European
Community Has Moved into Family Law, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 883, 883 (2002) (noting
that the EU's step into family law went largely unnoticed, at least in the United
Kingdom).
71. See Dieter Martiny, Objectives and Values of (Private) International Law in Family
Law, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW, supra note 67, at 69, 84 (noting that harmonizing
international family law will reduce forum shopping); McEleavy, supra note 70, at 888
(noting that uniform jurisdictional rules would ease problems associated with marital
property and remarriage).
72. See Brussels II, supra note 66, art. 27(1), at 9 ("Where proceedings involving the
same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different
Member States, any court other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.");
see also Brussels II bis, supra note 10, art. 19(3), at 9 ("Where the jurisdiction of the court
first seised is established, the court second seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of
that court.").
73. See supra note 72 (quoting Brussels II and Brussels II bis); McEleavy, supra note
70, at 886 ("To ensure that no conflicts ofjurisdiction arise, [Brussels II] employs a lis
pendens provision based on the strict application of the prior temporis formula.").
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enforcement of judgments and judicial trust between Member
States.74
Work on Brussels II bis began shortly after Brussels II had
taken effect.75 Now that mutual enforcement and recognition
had become the basis for regulating civil matters, the European
Council and Commission began drafting a regulation that would
encompass all children (whether born in or out of wedlock) and
child abductions.76 The Regulation furthered the EU's general
goals of enforcement and recognition of judicial decisions
between Member States.77
Like all regulations promulgated by the EU, Brussels II bis
has direct effect in the Member States and needs no
implementing legislation to be enforceable in national courts.78
Despite this fact, the Regulation is not always a stand-alone
provision. Some Member States, including Ireland,79 have
74. Compare supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that the Hague
Abduction Convention rejected a model based on recognition and enforcement); with
Alegria Borrits, From Brussels II to Brussels II bis and Further, in BRUSSELS II BIS: ITS IMPACT
AND APPLICATION IN THE MEMBER STATES 3, 7 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2007)
(noting the EU's "preference" for encouraging mutual trust between Member States);
and McGLYNN, supra note 67, at 162 (commenting that the regulations were not
necessarily advantageous because they only apply between Member States, whereas the
Hague Conventions have the potential to be a global solution).
75. See Borrds, supra note 74, at 23 (remarking on the four-year lifespan of Brussels
II and the potentially short lifespan of Brussels II bis); McEleavy, supra note 70, at 503-
12 (noting the short duration of Brussels II's effectiveness).
76. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 65, at 15 (noting that Brussels II could only be
applied to children of both parents during matrimonial proceedings, and that Brussels
II bis is not so confined); see also Brussels II bis, supra note 10, pmbl., at 1 ("In order to
ensure equality for all children, this Regulation covers all decisions on parental
responsibility, including measures for the protection of the child, independently of any
link with a matrimonial proceeding.").
77. See Bogdan, supra note 69, at 304 (explaining that conflict of law and
jurisdictional problems have an indirect effect on the proper functioning of the
European Community's internal market).
78. See TFEU, supra note 64, art. 288, 2010 0.J. C 83/47, at 171 (quoting the
portion of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union that states all
regulations are directly effective and applicable between Member States); Brussels II bis,
supra note 10, at 19 ("This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly
applicable in the Member States. . . ."); see also BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at 780 ("A
Regulation ... has legal force in the Member States without the need for any further
domestic legislative act.").
79. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing Ireland's statutory
instrument).
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developed statutory instruments augmenting the Regulation to
make it consistent with domestic law.80
The Irish Minister for Justice, Equality, and Law Reform
promulgated Statutory Instrument 112/2005 with Brussels II
bis.8 1 This statutory instrument changed Section 15 of the Child
Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act (the statute
implementing the Hague Abduction Convention in Ireland).82
Under Statutory Instrument 112/2005, when Ireland is presented
with an Article 15 Hague Abduction Convention request from a
Member State, it must make the determination based on Brussels
II bis.83 Thus, a judge would have to determine whether the
removal of the children was "wrongful" as defined by the
Regulation, which is different than the previous practice of
determining whether the removal was "wrongful" as defined by
the Convention. 4
80. See LOWE ET AL., supra note 65, at 1 (mentioning the statutory instrument
promulgated in Great Britain); Borrds, supra note 74, at 27 (listing Belgium, Estonia,
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as countries
that have enacted laws clarifying the relationship between the Regulation and domestic
law).
81. See European Communities (Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and Matters of
Parental Responsibility) Regulations 2005 (S.I. No. 112/2005) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2005/en/si/0112.html [hereinafter S.1 No. 112/2005];
see also European Communities Act 1972 (Act No. 27/1972), §§ 1-3 (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/ 1972/en/act/pub/0027/print.htsmi (giving effect to the
treaties of the European Community and all supplemental treaties in Irish law, and
authorizing Irish ministers to create statutory instruments, such as S.I. No. 112/2005,
allowing European law to be binding in domestic law).
82. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 13.1.2 (granting the president the power to appoint,
inter alia, ministers upon the nomination of the Taoiseach); S.I No. 112/2005, supra
note 81; Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991 (Act No.
6/1991) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1991/en/act/pub/0006/
print.html; see also J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, 1 20 (Ir.) (noting the change and
reciting the new language); J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, 1 46 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (quoting
the new statutory language).
83. See S.I No. 112/2005, supra note 81, § 8(d) ("The Court may, on an
application made for the purposes of Article 15 of the Hague Convention by any
person appearing to the Court to have an interest in the matter, make a declaration
that the removal of any child from, or his retention outside, the State was-(a) in
the case of a removal to or retention in a Member State, a wrongful removal or
retention within the meaning of Article 2 of the Council Regulation, or (b) in any
other case, wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention.").
84. Id. Compare Brussels II bis, supra note 11, art. 2(9), at 4 ("[T he term 'rights of
custody' shall include rights and duties relating to the care of the person of a child, and
in particular the right to determine the child's place of residence"), with supra note 39
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Brussels II bis has an explicit relationship to the Hague
Abduction Convention. 85 Recital 17 of the preamble and Article
62 of the Regulation state that the Hague Convention is still valid
between Member States.8 6 Article 60, however, clarifies that the
Regulation takes precedence over the Convention.87
C. European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union
The modern concept of human rights in Europe today
originates from World War 11.88 In 1950, the Council of Europe
developed the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"). 89 The
ECHR remains the "bedrock of human rights debates" in
Europe, and is a "commonly agreed statement of the rights to be
given primacy within Europe."90 Actual protection of these
human rights, however, is left to the Member States'
constitutions, and individual citizens are permitted to appeal to
the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR").91 Because all
and accompanying text (quoting the definition "custody rights" under the Hague
Abduction Convention).
85. See Brussels II bis, supra note 10, art. 62(2), at 17 ("The conventions mentioned
in Article 60, in particular the 1980 Hague Convention, continue to produce effects
between the Member States which are party thereto . . . ."); id. art. 60, at 16 (" [T]his
Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions in so far as they
concern matters governed by this Regulation: ... the Hague Convention of 25 October
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.").
86. See Brussels II bis, supra note 10, art. 62(2), at 17.
87. See id. art. 60, at 16.
88. See NOELINE BLACKWELL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 48 (Brid Moriarty et al.
eds., 2d ed. 2008) (noting that a group of nations "appalled by the atrocities" of World
War II ("WWI") came together to form the Council of Europe and draft the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("ECHR")); Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: An
Appraisal, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1104, 1106 (discussing the ECHR as one of many post-
WWII European treaties).
89. See Defeis, supra note 88, at 1105 ("[T]he European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") was signed in
1950"); BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 48 ("[I1n 1950, the Council of Europe
adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. . .. "); see also ECHR, supra note 18.
90. MCGLYNN, supra note 67, at 14.
91. BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 51 (observing that the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECtHR") was the first international court to give individuals
"automatic direct access for alleged breaches of a state's international obligations");
Defeis, supra note 88, at 1107 (noting that every Member State has ratified the ECHR).
1446 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1430
ECHR contracting states must accept the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR, and the court's decisions are final and binding, this
remedy is significant.92
The ratification of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties
furthered the impact of the ECHR by formally including ECHR
rights in European Community law.93 Article F of the Maastricht
Treaty provided that "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR]." 94 Further, the Amsterdam
Treaty added, "[t]he Union is founded on the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms."95 Neither treaty, however, actually made the rights
binding upon the actions of the EU. 96 Thus, individual remedy
remained solely with the ECtHR.97
In 2000, the European Council (not to be confused with the
Council of Europe, which developed the ECHR) organized the
drafting of the Charter.98  This document "explicitly
reaffirm[ed]" the rights specified in the ECHR and enumerated
more rights.99 Despite the Charter's nonbinding status, the Court
92. See BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 48 (noting that contracting states can be
held accountable to individual citizens by the ECtHR); BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at
797-98 (stating that cases brought by individuals are final and binding).
93. URSULA KILKELLY, ECHR AND IRISH LAW 47 (2004) (discussing the two treaties'
provisions regarding the ECHR). The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties are two steps
in a series of treaties that establish and govern the EU as it exists today. See PIRIS, supra
note 15, at 7-70 (providing a brief overview of the treaty developments creating the EU).
94. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, tit. I, art. F, 1992
O.J. C 191/1 [hereinafter Maastricht TEU].
95. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 69, art. 1(8).
96. BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 151-52 (noting that because the European
Community is not a party to the ECHR, its institutions may not be brought before the
ECtHR); Defeis, supra note 88, at 1115 (noting that the Court ofJustice is not bound by
the ECtHR and therefore there is a potential for differing interpretations of the ECHR).
97. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing individual remedy
available from the ECtHR).
98. See BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at 768-69 (stating that the European Council is
the "main decision-making body of the European Community and Union" and is almost
exclusively comprised of the Member State's heads of government); id. at 746 (noting
the drafting conference was comprised of representatives of the European Parliament,
national parliaments, national governments, and the European Commission); see also
BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 166-67 ("The Charter was drafted by a unique body
composed of 62 representatives of the Member State governments, the Commission, the
European Parliament and the national parliaments."); supra notes 15-18 (noting the
relationship between the Charter and the rights of an unmarried father to his children).
99. KILKELLY, supra note 93, at 50 ("In terms of its catalogue of rights, the Charter
contains all the rights contained in the ECHR, and many more."); Defeis, supra note 88,
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of Justice of the European Union integrated the provisions (and
the decisions of the ECtHR on the ECHR) into its jurisprudence
and, therefore, into "the fabric of the Union."100 These two
sources of human rights, however, remain legally distinct and
operate in parallel. 101
Wherever the Charter contains rights that correspond to the
ECHR, the meaning and scope of the Charter must be the same
as the ECHR.102 This is, however, paradoxical because the
Charter also states that it can be interpreted to provide greater
protections than the ECHR. 03 The relationship between the
Court ofJustice and the ECtHR continues to develop and overlap
with the advance of each court's jurisprudence, but the paradox
remains unresolved. 104
The Lisbon Treaty, effective December 2009, made the
Charter, and the rights it protects, legally binding for the first
time.105 This elevation, as one scholar has noted, however, is not
as groundbreaking as it may seem.10 6 The Charter's provisions are
irrelevant when Member States apply their domestic law because
the provisions are applicable only when Member States are
at 1108, 1111 (mentioning that the Court ofJustice uses the term "fundamental rights"
because it is broader than "human rights").
100. See, e.g., Varec SA v. ttat belge, Case C-450/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1-581, 1 48
(deferring to the ECtHR's interpretation of "private life"); Defeis, supra note 88, at
1108, 1113-14.
101. KILKELLY, supra note 93, at 50 (noting that Article 53(2) of the Charter was
added specifically to ensure parallelism); see Charter of Rights, supra note 18, art. 52(3),
2010 O.J. C 83, at 402 ("In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to
rights guaranteed by the [ECHR), the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the
same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union
law providing more extensive protection.").
102. See supra note 101 (quotingArticle 52(3) of the Charter of Rights).
103. See supra note 101 (quoting Article 52(3) of the Charter of Rights).
104. See BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 88, at 153-55 (providing an overview of pre-
Lisbon Treaty Court ofJustice jurisprudence on accession); PIRIS, supra note 15, at 163-
67 (describing the process by which the Lisbon Treaty permits the Court of Justice to
accede to the ECtHR and noting that the process is complicated and has not yet been
realized).
105. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the nonbinding
nature of the Charter pre-Lisbon Treaty); supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting
that the Charter became binding under the Lisbon Treaty).
106. See PIRIS, supra note 15, at 159-60 (explaining that elevating the Charter to
binding status does not "fundamentally alter[] the pre-existing legal situation").
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applying EU law.'0 7 Additionally, the Charter explicitly does not
"establish any new power or task for the Community or the
Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined by the Treaties."108
Thus, while the Charter was the EU's first formal recognition that
the EU plays an important role in the way families are regulated
within Europe, its provisions concerning family law have been
used to "entrench the status quo," favoring the traditional
marriage as the basis of family life.109
Brussels II bis, nevertheless, explicitly affirms the Charter in
Recital 33 of the preamble: "This Regulation recognises the
fundamental rights and observes the principles of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union."110 Additionally,
both documents affirm that the child's interests are paramount
in all matters.'"
During intra-EU Hague Abduction Convention cases, a party
may invoke her right to respect for family life, as embodied in
Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter."2 The ECtHR
interprets "family life" as an autonomous concept, and the
threshold for establishing it is quite low." 3 In Lebbink v. the
Netherlands, the ECtHR reiterated its position: "A child born out
of [wedlock] is ipso jure part of that 'family' unit from the
107. Charter of Rights, supra note 18, art. 51(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 402 ("The
provisions of this Charter are addressed ... to the Member States only when they are
implementing Union law.").
108. Id. art. 51(2).
109. See MGGLYNN, supra note 67, at 18, 21; see also D. & Kingdom of Sweden v.
Council, Joined Cases 122 & 125/99 P, [2001] E.C.R. 1-4319 (declining to extend ECHR
Article 8 right to private and family life to a homosexual couple).
110. Brussels II his, supra note 10, pmbl., at 3
111. Compare Charter of Rights, supra note 18, art. 24(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 396
("In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private
institutions, the child's best interests must be a primary consideration."), with Brussels II
bis, supra note 10, pmbl., at 3 ("In particular, [the Regulation] seeks to ensure respect
for the fundamental rights of the child as set out in Article 24 of the [Charter]. . . ." ).
112. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (noting the Charter's provision on
the right to respect for family life).
113. See, e.g., Lebbink v. The Netherlands, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 183, 193 ("The
Court reiterates that the notion of 'family life' under Article 8 of the Convention is not
confined to marriage-based relationships and may encompass other de facto 'family'
ties. . .. "); Keegan v. Ireland, 290 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44 (1994) ("There ... exists
between the child and his parents a bond amounting to family life even if at the time of
his or her birth the parents are no longer co-habiting or if their relationship has then
ended."); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 330, 341-42 (1979)
(reiterating that a state cannot define or interfere with the existence of family life as
defined by the ECHR).
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moment, and by the very fact, of its birth. Thus there exists
between the child and the parents a relationship amounting to
family life."' 14
As evidenced by Guichard v. France, the degree of "respect"
guaranteed is also low. 1 5 Mr. Jean-Luc Guichard was never
married to the mother of his son.116 After years of living together,
the mother unilaterally took their son to Canada, her native
country." 7 Under French law, unmarried mothers have
automatic custody of their children and fathers have a right to
apply for custody." 8 Guichard thus did not have rights to his
child, nor had he exercised his right to apply prior to the
mother's removal of their son to Canada.119 Guichard argued
that it was a violation of his rights under Articles 8 and 14 not to
recognize inchoate rights of custody because he had a right to
enjoy family life and a right not to be discriminated against for
his choice not to marry. 120 In this case, the ECtHR did not find a
violation of Article 8 or of Article 14 of the ECHR.121 The ECHR
determined that securing the father's right to apply for custody
was sufficient respect for family life and protection from
discrimination.122 Thus the refusal of France to recognize
automatic rights of custody for the purposes of a Hague
Convention application was not a violation of Guichard's right to
respect for family life or guarantee against discrimination.'23
J.McB. found himself in a similar position as Guichard.
J.McB. had no prior notice of the move nor did he know to
114. Lebbink, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 193.
115. See Guichard v. France, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 423.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 427 (explaining that French statutory law states that parental
responsibility lies with the mother in circumstances such as Guichard's).
119. Id. (noting that the parents did not apply for joint parental responsibility as
allowed for under French law).
120. Id. at 434; see also supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (noting that
J.McB. also made this argument, which had been decided under the pre-Lisbon EU
treaties).
121. Guichard, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. at 434 (" [T]he applicant's complaint based on
Article 8 of the Convention must be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. . . ."); id ("It
follows that [the complaint based on Article 14] is manifestly ill-founded and must be
dismissed....").
122. See supra note 116 (quoting the ECtHR's holdings).
123. Id.
14492011]
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where his family had gone.'24 After locating his family in L.E.'s
childhood hometown, he petitioned the English court for an
originating summons ordering his children returned to Ireland
pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention.125 In accordance
with Convention Article 15, the English court asked J.McB. to
obtain a declaration that the children were wrongfully removed
from Ireland before it would order the children returned.126
Article 15 of the Hague Abduction Convention refers to Article 3,
which defines the conditions under which a removal is
"wrongful."' 27 In essence, J.McB. must have had rights under
Irish law that satisfy the Convention's definition of "rights of
custody" and been exercising those rights before the English
court would order the children be returned to Ireland.128
Only if the Convention was applicable would the Irish courts
have determined that L.E. lawfully took the children out of
Ireland because, under the Convention, unmarried fathers do
not have automatic rights of custody. 129 The Irish courts looked at
the Guardianship of Infants Act, as amended, compared it to the
definition of custody in Article 5 of the Convention, and
concluded that because J.McB. was not married to L.E. and had
not applied for custody, domestic law did not recognize custody
rights as defined by the Convention.'3 s The English court,
therefore, would not have ordered that the children be returned
because the Irish courts determined that J.McB. did not have
rights under Irish law that satisfied the definition of custody
124. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (reiterating thatJ.McB. did not know
where his family had gone).
125. See supra notes 4, 21, and accompanying text (explaining the events leading
up toJ.McB. filing suit in Ireland).
126. SeeJ.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, 1 7 (Ir.) (stating that the English court
asked J.McB. for a Hague Abduction Convention Article 125 declaration); see also supra
note 42 and accompanying text (discussing Article 15 declarations).
127. See supra note 39 (quoting Article 3 of the Hague Abduction Convention).
128. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful removal
and custody rights under the Hague Abduction Convention).
129. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful removal
and custody rights under the Hague Abduction Convention).
130. Id; see supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (explaining "rights of
custody" under the Hague Abduction Convention); supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text (noting that, in Irish domestic law, the mother of a child who is not
married to the father has sole guardianship of the child, and therefore sole rights of
custody for the purposes of the Hague Abduction Convention).
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rights found in the Convention.131 J.McB., however, sought relief
additional to the Hague Abduction Convention Article 15
determination requested by the English court. 32 He sought, inter
alia, a declaration that the removal was wrongful under Brussels
II bis. 33
In arguing that the Regulation changed the analysis the
High Court was required to do, J.McB. forced Justice John Mac
Menamin to address how the Regulation and the Hague
Abduction Convention interact in Irish law. 134 Statutory
Instrument 112/2005 was implemented in Ireland to try to
conform Irish law with Brussels II bis and states that the
Regulation supersedes the Hague Abduction Convention.135 The
thrust of J.McB.'s argument centered on Statutory Instrument
112/2005 and its impact on the analysis of a Hague Abduction
Convention Article 15 request. Justice Mac Menamin had to
consider whether he was confined to traditional Convention
analysis because the English court had only asked for a
determination under Hague Abduction Convention Article 15 or
if the Regulation, and therefore the Charter, also applied.3 6 This
was a question of first impression in Ireland. 37
L.E. argued that the High Court was confined to consider
the matter solely pursuant to the Hague Abduction Convention
131. J.McB., [20101 1ESC 48, 11 28-34 (summarizing the Irish statutory and case
law, and applying it toJ.McB.'s situation).
132. J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, 2 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (listing guardianship, rights
of access, and determinations under the Hague Abduction Convention and Brussels II
bis as reliefs requested by J.McB.); see also supra note 42 (discussing Hague Abduction
Convention Article 15 requests).
133. JMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 1 2.
134. See id. 11 75-76 (explaining J.McB.'s submissions on this point).
135. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Statutory Instrument
112/2005 and its enactment, and explaining that it changes the language of the
implementing legislation for the Hague Convention in Ireland to accommodate the
Regulation).
136. SeejMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 11 36-53 (analyzing whether the High Court was
confined to analysis under Hague Abduction Convention Article 15); supra note 16
(noting that after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter applies
whenever a court is applying EU law).
137. JMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 1 49 ("I must reject the submission that the
statutory remit of this Court should be confined to determine whether the removal was
wrongful within the meaning of the Hague Convention, as opposed to [Brussels II bis].
No authority was cited on this question. It appears not to have been previously decided
elsewhere.").
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because the only basis for its jurisdiction was the Article 15
request from the English court.38
Justice Mac Menamin instead accepted that the Irish courts
must determine its jurisdiction under its national laws, and that
Irish law did not limit him to merely consider the Convention
when hearing an Article 15 request.139 Justice Mac Menamin
came to this conclusion by quoting Section 8(2) (iii) of Statutory
Instrument 112/2005.140 It reads: "References in [the Child
Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders] to the Hague
Convention shall, where the context requires in relation to
applications under the Hague Convention to which [Brussels II
bis] relates, be deemed to include references to [Brussels II
bis].""1
Moving forward in his reasoning, Justice Mac Menamin then
looked at Brussels 11 bis to see how it affected an Article 15
analysis.142 He determined that the language found in Recital 17
of the preamble and Article 60 of the Regulation required all
inconsistencies between the Regulation and the Hague
Abduction Convention to be resolved in favor of the
Regulation.'43 Thus, Justice Mac Menamin held that the
definitions in Article 2 of Brussels II bis completely replaced
those in Article 3 of the Convention. 144
Based on this analysis, Justice Mac Menamin concluded that
he must determine whether L.E.'s removal of the children to
England was wrongful under Brussels II bis.14 5 To reiterate,
138. Id. 47 ("[L.E.] submitted that the jurisdiction of a court in Hague
Convention proceedings to request an applicant to obtain a determination from the
authorities in the State of a child's habitual residence is contained only in Article 15 of
the Hague Convention . . . .").
139. Id. 1 48 ("It is a matter for the court in [the State that received the Article 15
request] to determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain an application for a
determination on foot of an Article 15 request under its own national law.").
140. Id. 11 82-87 (discussing how S.I. 112/2005, Brussels II bis, and the Hague
Abduction Convention overlap).
141. S.I No. 112/2005, supra note 81, § 8(a) (iii).
142. See jMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 75-89 (discussing how Brussels I bis affects
Hague Abduction Convention analysis).
143. Id. 62 (finding Brussels II bis to be supreme); see supra note 85 and
accompanying text (quoting recital 17 of the preamble and Article 60 of Brussels II bis).
144. SeejMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 11 58-63 (explaining his reasoning).
145. See id. 1 63 ("[T]he text of the Regulation is explicit-the role of this Court is
to make a determination pursuant to Article 2 of [Brussels II his]; not Article 3 of the
Convention as it stood previously."). Compare Brussels II bis, supra note 10, art. 2(11), at
4 ("[Tlhe term 'wrongful removal or retention' shall mean a child's removal or
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Justice Mac Menamin's analysis leads to the conclusion that the
traditional Hague Abduction Convention Article 15 analysis does
not apply because the interaction between Statutory Instrument
112/2005 and Brussels II bis supersedes Article 15.146 In other
words, Statutory Instrument 112/2005 does two things: first,
according to Mac Menamin's interpretation, it permits a judge
confronted with a Convention Article 15 request to apply the
Regulation as well; and then it replaces Convention Article 15
analysis with analysis under the Regulation. Because an EU law,
Brussels II bis, was now applicable to the J.McB. case, the Charter
also applied-and rights given in the Charter added a layer of
complexity to the question of whether L.E.'s removal of the
children from Ireland was wrongful.147
Human rights formed the crux of J.McB.'s rationale for why
L.E. wrongfully removed his children from Ireland.)< The right
to respect for private and family life, embodied in Article 8 of the
ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter, was the most highly relevant
provision to J.McB.'s case.149 According to the ECtHR's
jurisprudence, respect for family must harmonize individual
autonomy and community interests. 50 The ECtHR continually
retention where: (a) it is in breach of rights of custody acquired by judgment or by
operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect under the law of the Member
State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and (b) provided that, at the time of removal or retention, the rights of
custody were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised
but for the removal or retention."), with supra note 39 (quoting Article 3 of the Hague
Abduction Convention).
146. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (restating Justice Mac Menamin's
analysis).
147. See supra note 16 (noting that the Charter applies whenever courts are
applying EU law).
148. See J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, 1 21-22 (Ir.) (outlining J.McB.'s
submissions to the Supreme Court).
149. See id. 11 21-22 (summarizing J.McB.'s arguments on Article 8 of the ECHR
and Article 7 of the Charter); supra note 18 and accompanying text (quoting the
provisions); see also the European Convention on Human Rights 2003 (Act No. 20/2003)
(Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/acts.html (enacting the ECHR in
Ireland, giving Irish nationals recourse at the ECtHR); McD. v. L., [20071 IESC 28, 88
(Ir.) (clarifying that the ECHR does not have direct effect in Irish law, and stating that
Irish courts should look to the ECtHR for interpretive guidance).
150. See Kroon v. Netherlands, 297 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 46, 56 (1994) (noting that
Article 8 places positive and negative obligations on a state and stating that, in both
circumstances, "regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole"); Guichard v.
France, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, 431.
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works to find the appropriate balance. 51 While the ECtHR has
technically freed the definition of family in Article 8 from the
anchor of marriage, the ECtHR has not moved it much beyond
relationships that resemble traditional marriages. 52 Additionally,
due to the dramatic increase in the number of children born out
of wedlock, declining to expand the concept of family in human
rights law has left many people, including children, and
relationships outside the protections of the ECHR.s53
Before the Irish High Court, J.McB. argued that failing to
recognize his "inchoate rights" of custody in Irish domestic law
was a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR as enacted by Ireland.154
J.McB. further argued that his Article 7 Charter rights were
violated by the same failure because an EU law, Brussels II bis,
was applicable to his case.155 In sum and substance, J.McB.
contended that Ireland had a positive obligation under Article 8
of the ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter to ensure that his
family life was respected, and that Ireland's refusal to recognize
his inchoate rights of custody was a breach of that obligation.156
151. See McGLYNN, supra note 67, at 16 (citing Kroon v. Netherlands, 297 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 56); Stalford, supra note 68, at 103-05 (discussing the relationship between
collective rights of the family and individual rights and summarizing the ECtHR's
position on "family life").
152. See McGLYNN, supra note 67, at 16-17 (discussing ECtHR case law finding
families sufficiently similar to traditional marital families deserving of respect); Stalford,
supra note 72, at 105 (listing a few ECtHR cases that have begun to expand the
definition of family to include relationships not based on traditional marriages); see also
J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, 134 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (noting that the Court ofJustice
has yet to use its power to expand the scope of "family life" beyond ECtHR
jurisprudence).
153. See MCGLYNN, supra note 67, at 23 (discussing the dangers of basing family law
on traditional nuclear families and noting that failing to protect the relationships
between parents and children born out of wedlock as vigorously as ones based on
traditional marriages makes the latter comparatively more difficult to sustain); Stalford,
supra note 68, at 105 (listing children, homosexuals, transsexuals, and unmarried fathers
as groups that were not protected by the ECHR).
154. JMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 1 75 (outliningJ.McB.'s submissions).
155. See id. 77 (explaining that J.McB.'s argument is based on the fact that the
language used in both articles is substantially the same and that the Lisbon Treaty gave
the Charter binding authority on EU law).
156. See id. ("U.McB.] submits that, as a matter of ECHR jurisprudence, the
obligation devolving on a State is positive, i.e. to ensure that a tie or bond of a family
nature develops[;] ... that a State cannot discriminate purely on marital status on
matters of this kind; and that a failure to attribute to a father in a 'de facto relationship'
the same status as a married father is in breach of Article 14 of the Convention ... in
conjunction with Article 8 ... is discriminating under ECHR."); see also BYRNE ET AL.,
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J.McB. also argued that the Irish domestic law giving married
fathers automatic custody rights while denying unmarried fathers
the same recognition violated the Article 14 ECHR right to be
protected from discrimination on the basis of marital status.'5 7
As noted above, J.McB. had the opportunity to renew these
settled points because he fortuitously filed his case in Ireland just
twenty-two days after the Lisbon Treaty took effect. 58 The
Charter leaves the Court ofJustice with the power to expand the
protections afforded by the ECHR.169 J.McB. attempted to
capitalize on this power by arguing that the Court of Justice's
interpretation of the Charter should break away from the
ECtHR's jurisprudence and extend automatic rights of custody to
unmarried fathers.160 According to J.McB., if the Charter
mandated the extension, the Irish courts would be forced to
recognize that, under Brussels 11 bis, J.McB. did have custody
rights and, therefore, L.E. wrongly removed the children from
Ireland.'6 ' Consequently, the English court would have to order
that the children be returned to Ireland.162
Conversely, L.E. submitted that, even if the Irish courts were
not confined to traditional Article 15 Hague Abduction
Convention analysis, J.McB. still did not have "rights of custody"
for purposes of Brussels II bis because Brussels II bis was never
supra note 16, at 316 (noting that the Court ofJustice's opinions are binding precedent
in Member States).
157. See ECHR, supra note 18, art. 14 ("The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status."); see also
JMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, 75 (noting thatJ.McB. made arguments under both Articles
8 and 14 of the ECHR, contending that marital status was included in "other status" of
Article 14); Guichard v. France, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, 434 (implying that marital
status is included in "other status" for the purposes of Article 14 ECHR analysis).
158. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (stating that J.McB. filed in Ireland
on December 23, 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty came into effect on December 1, 2009); see
also supra notes 115-22 (discussing Guichard, the precedent on these arguments).
159. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (noting that the ECHR sets a
minimum level of protection).
160. See J.McB. v. L.E., [2010] IESC 48, 21-22 (Ir.) (outlining J.McB.'s
arguments to the Irish Supreme Court).
161. Compare supra note 39 (quoting the definition of "rights of custody" found in
the Hague Abduction Convention), with supra note 84 (quoting the definition of "rights
of custody" found in Brussels II bis).
162. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that a Central Authority
is obliged to return a child if the child was wrongfully removed).
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intended to create a unique definition of "rights of custody"
diverging from the Hague Abduction Convention's definition.163
She further contended that accepting J.McB.'s argument would
mean that establishing "family life," which is easily accomplished,
would also establish "rights of custody" under the Regulation and
the Convention.164 L.E. argued that such an interpretation would
undercut the Convention altogether because the Convention was
meant to work in conjunction with domestic law, and this
interpretation would supplant domestic laws on custody.165 She
also cautioned against conflating Brussels II bis and the Hague
Abduction Convention because it could result in divergent
interpretations of "custody rights," one interpretation solely
under the Convention and another under the Regulation.166
Unfortunately for J.McB., the Irish High Court found an
ECtHR case to be dispositive of the human rights question.167
Relying on Guichard, Justice Mac Menamin held that the
amended Guardianship of Infants Act, as applied to J.McB., does
not violate his right to respect for family life, or his right to be
163. SeeJMcB., [2010] IESC 48, 1 24 ("It was never intended that the provisions of
[Brussels II bis] would have the effect of establishing two separate, albeit interlinked,
strands of law governing the removal or return of a child.").
164. See id. 25 ("[G]iven the low threshold required to establish family life the
vast majority of parents who have access to their children would reach that threshold.
The use of the threshold of family life as the threshold to establish 'rights of custody'
would blur and undermine the distinction between 'rights of custody' and 'rights of
access' in the Hague Convention.").
165. See id. 24 ("[I] t was never intended that the coming into effect of [Brussels
II bis] would have the effect that a removal or retention of a child could be lawful for
the purposes of Article 3 of the Hague Abduction Convention but unlawful for the
purposes of Article 2 of [Brussels II his].").
166. J.Mc.B v. L.E., [2010] IEHC 123, It 52-53 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (noting that to
conclude that references to the Hague Abduction Convention should not include
references to the Regulation when two Member States are involved could "give rise to an
anomaly where, in the absence of fully expressing and giving effect to the Regulation,
provisions or decisions of Member States might give rise to divergent interpretations of
what is to be an autonomous code. This, clearly, would be at variance from the intent of
the Regulation which governs the situation regarding two or more Member States."); id.
11 62-64 (noting the problem with divergent interpretations of the definitions and
expressing that all Member States should consider themselves bound by the definitions
in Brussels II bis in all cases because of the supremacy of EU law over nation law
implementing the Hague Abduction Convention).
167. Id. 88 ("[I]t emerged that there was [ECtHR] jurisprudence which directly
addressed a set of facts almost identical to this case. Guichard v. France . . . is, I consider,
a case directly on point.").
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free from discrimination in enjoying that right.168 Justice Mac
Menamin therefore concluded that J.McB. did not have rights of
custody in Irish law and that the English court should therefore
handle the question of custody rights because the children had
been legally removed from Ireland.'69
J.McB. appealed the Irish High Court's decision to the
Supreme Court of Ireland.o70  The Irish Supreme Court171
affirmed Justice Mac Menamin's determination that J.McB. had
no rights of custody under Irish law and therefore did not have
rights of custody for the purposes of a Hague Abduction
Convention Article 15 request. 72 The Supreme Court did not
make determinations on Brussels II bis or the human rights
arguments because it incorporated those issues into a question it
certified to the Court of Justice.s73 The Irish Supreme Court
asked whether the Charter, or any other EU provision, precluded
168. Id. 89 ("Insofar ... as the applicant seeks to rely on [ECtHR] jurisprudence,
I do not consider ... that it is of assistance to his case."); see supra notes 115-22
(discussing the facts and holding of Guichard).
169. jMcB., [2010] IEHC 123, T 160 ("[T]he English Courts should exercise
jurisdiction on the substantive issue and not the Irish Courts."); see also Children Act,
1989, c. 41, §§ 1, 3 (as amended by Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 38, § 111) (Eng.)
(stating that, in England, fathers registered on the birth certificate of the child have
automatic "parental responsibility," defined as "all the rights, duties, powers,
responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child
and his property"). The Children Act is the main law governing custody in England. See
HUTCHINSON & SETRIGHT, supra note 6, at 178.
170. J.McB3., [20101 IESC 48, 1 10 (" [].McB.] has appealed to the Supreme Court
against the judgment of the High Court."); see IR. CONST., 1937, art. 34(4) (3) ("The
Supreme Court shall ... have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High
Court. . . ."); BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at 299 (noting that Ireland does not have an
intermediate appellate court for civil matters, and cases are appealed from the High
Court directly to the highest court in Ireland, the Supreme Court).
171. The Supreme Court sat as a panel of five justices: Justices Susan Denham, Nial
Fennelly, Joseph Finnegan, Fidelma Macken, and Donal O'Donnell. See JMcB., [2010]
IESC 48.
172. Id. 1 34 (" [A]s a matter of Irish national law, [J.McB.], having failed to secure
or even apply for an order granting him custody, on 25th July 2009, had no rights of
custody in respect of the three children. This Court would so hold for the purposes . . .
of the Hague Convention independently of the effect of [Brussels II bis]. It would
accordingly respond to the proceedings brought at the request of the English Court by
saying that the children were not wrongfully removed from Ireland on 25thJuly 2009.").
173. See id. 39-41 (discussing Brussels II bis and explaining the law giving rise to
the Supreme Court's need for interpretation); see also TFEU, supra note 64, art. 267,
2010 O.J. C 83, at 164 (requiring a court of final appeal in a Member State to certify any
question of Community law that the court considers necessary to enable it to give a
judgment). See generally BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at 315-17 (discussing the Court of
Justice's appellate jurisdiction).
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Ireland from requiring an unmarried father to apply for custody
rights before he could qualify as having custody rights as defined
by Brussels II bis.174
This Part has provided an overview of the provisions of the
Hague Abduction Convention, Irish domestic law on rights of
custody, Brussels II bis, the ECHR, and the Charter that were
relevant toJ.McB.'s case. This Part then outlined J.McB.'s case in
chief before the Irish High and Supreme Courts, summarizing
the arguments of both J.McB. and L.E. Next, Part II examines the
Supreme Court's certified question to the Court ofJustice.
II. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT OFJUSTICE
The Court of Justice received the Supreme Court's question
under a new urgent certification procedure.175 The procedure
allows the Court of Justice to hear cases quickly if there are both
factual circumstances and statutory provisions that warrant an
expedited hearing of the matter.1 76 J.McB.'s case satisfied these
requirements because there was factual urgency in that J.McB.'s
relationship with his three children wasjeopardized and statutory
urgency in that Brussels II bis states that "return of the child
should be obtained without delay."' 77 Under this urgent
procedure, the Court ofJustice was able to give a clear opinion in
less than two months, an exceedingly short period of time.178
174. J.McB., [2010] IESC 48, 1 44 ("Does [Brussels II bis], whether interpreted
pursuant to Article 7 of [the Charter] or otherwise, preclude a Member State from
requiring by its law that the father of a child who is not married to the mother shall have
obtained an order of a court of competent jurisdiction granting him custody in order to
qualify as having 'custody rights' which render the removal of that child from its country
of habitual residence wrongful for the purposes of Article 2.11 of that Regulation?").
175. J.McB. v. L.E., Case C-400/10, [2010] E.C.R. I_ (delivered Oct. 5, 2010) (not
yet reported), 26 ("The [Irish Supreme Court] requested that this reference for a
preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent procedure provided for in Article
104b of the Court's Rules of Procedure.").
176. See Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Court ofjustice, 2008 O.J. L
24/39, at 40-41 (adding Article 104b to Court ofJustice's rules of procedure).
177. J.McB., [20101 E.C.R. I-, 11 27-29 ("The reason stated by the referring
court for [requesting the urgent procedure] is that, according to recital 17 in the
preamble to [Brussels II bis], in cases of wrongful removal of a child, the return of the
child should be obtained without delay.... Given that the children concerned, and
especially the youngest, are young children, the continuation of the current situation
might seriously harm their relationships with their father.").
178. See id. (dating the opinion October 5, 2010); Reference for a Preliminary
Ruling from the Supreme Court (Ireland) made on 6 August 2010-J. McB. v L. E., 2010
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This Part examines the Court of Justice's response to the
Irish Supreme Court's question in three sections: Section A
reviews the Court of Justice's jurisdiction to answer the certified
question; Section B examines the Court of Justice's
interpretation of Brussels II bis and its conclusion that the
Regulation is autonomous; and Section C discusses the Court of
Justice's analysis of J.McB.'s human rights argument and its
holding that requiring a father to apply for guardianship did not
violate his rights as guaranteed by the Charter.
A. Court offustice'sJurisdiction
The first hurdle the Court of Justice encountered in
answering the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Justice
had jurisdiction to issue a preliminary ruling on the certified
question.179 The Court of Justice only has jurisdiction over cases
in which EU law is at issue. 80 The European Commission'l8
raised the concern that the question was inadmissible because
the English court had asked only for a determination pursuant to
Hague Abduction Convention Article 15, meaning that no
question of EU law was raised. 18 This is a similar argument to the
one L.E. made before the Irish High Court. 83 The Court of
Justice, however, determined that it must rule on a certified
question unless it is "quite obvious" that the interpretation the
certifying court requests "bears no relation to the actual facts of
the main action or to [the law's] purpose."184 Thus, the Court of
Justice generally defers to the discretion of the national courts
O.J. C 260/13 (reporting that the Irish Supreme Court certified the question on August
6,2010).
179. See JMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_, 1 30-38 (reviewing the Court of Justice's
jurisdiction).
180. See BYRNE ET AL., supra note 16, at 774 ("[T]he binding nature of Community
law only applies to the areas of law with which the European Community and Union is
concerned.").
181. See JMcB., [20101 E.C.R. I (noting that submissions were given by Irish
counsel for both parents, Ireland, the German government, and the European
Commission).
182. See id. 1 30 (discussing the European Commission's concern as to whether EU
law was implicated and whether the Court of Justice had jurisdiction over the question
referred).
183. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (summarizing L.E.'s argument).
184. SeejMcB., [2010] E.C.R. 1, 11 32-34.
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and, if a national court finds it needs an interpretation of EU law,
the Court ofJustice provides a ruling.s 5
The Court of Justice accepted that the Irish Statutory
Instrument changed the language of an Article 15 request under
the Hague Abduction Convention as it functions in Ireland.186 In
effect, the Court of Justice accepted that in responding to the
English Court's request on the Convention's Article 15, the Irish
courts had to determine whether the removal was wrongful
under Brussels II bis Article 2, and not whether it was wrongful
under Convention Article 3.187 The Court of Justice, therefore,
determined that the question was admissible because Brussels II
bis, an EU regulation, was at issue. 88
B. Interpreting Brussels II bis
Having determined that the question was admissible, the
Court of Justice then ruled on the interpretation of "rights of
custody" under Brussels II bis and the effect of the Charter on
that interpretation.189 The Supreme Court's inquiry centered on
the definition of "rights of custody" and the Court of Justice
addressed this first. 90 It found the definition contained in
Brussels II bis to be autonomous, of consistent interpretation
throughout the EU, and not constrained by domestic law.191 The
Court held that the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning
185. See id. It 32-33 ("[Alccording to the Court's case-law, it is solely for the
national courts . .. to determine in the light of the special features of each case both the
need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable them to deliver judgment and the
relevance of the questions which they submit to the Court . . . ").
186. Id. 35 ("It is evident ... from the relevant national legislation, namely
Section 15 of the Child Abduction and Enforcement of Custody Orders Act 1991, as
amended by [Statutory Instrument 112/2005] that, in cases of removal of a child to
another Member State, the issue on which the national court must rule ... is whether
the removal is lawful under [Brussels II bis].").
187. See id.; see also supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing Statutory
Instrument 112/2005 and its promulgation in Ireland).
188. See JMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_, 11 35-38 (concluding that the question is
admissible).
189. See id. 39-64 (interpreting Brussels II bis).
190. See id. 39-41 (discussing the definition of "rights of custody").
191. See id. 41 ("It follows from the need for uniform application of Community
law and from the principle of equality that the terms of a provision of Community law
which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of
determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and
uniform interpretation throughout the Union . . . .").
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that "whether a child's removal is wrongful for the purposes of
applying that regulation is entirely dependent on the existence of
rights of custody, conferred by the relevant national law, in
breach of which that removal has taken place."192 In other words,
when the Irish courts apply the Regulation, they must determine
whether the father has rights in Irish domestic law that satisfy the
autonomous definition of "rights of custody" found in the
Regulation.193
C. Addressingj.McB.'s Human Rights Argument
The Court then addressed the question of whether the
Charter, as made binding by the Lisbon Treaty, precludes a
Member State from requiring an unmarried father to apply for
custody rights before the Member State must recognize his
custody rights under Brussels II bis.' 94 Recalling that Article 52(3)
of the Charter states that where the Charter and the ECHR
overlap, the Charter's meaning and scope is to be the same as the
ECHR, the Court declared that Article 8 of the ECHR is the same
as Article 7 of the Charter and that the ECtHR's interpretation of
Article 8 defines the minimum scope of Article 7 of the
Charter.195 In other words, the Court deferred to the ECtHR. 196
In deferring, the Court also considered Guichard v. France, which
held that respect for family life was not violated by giving sole
custody to unmarried mothers and providing the father the right
to apply for custody.17
192. Id. 44.
193. See id.
194. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (noting that the Lisbon Treaty gave
the Charter binding status).
195. See jMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_, 1 53 ("[I]t follows from Article 52(3) of the
Charter that, in so far as the Charter contains rights which correspond to rights
guaranteed by the ECHR, their meaning and scope are to be the same as those laid
down by the ECHR.... [I]t is clear that [the Charter's] Article 7 contains rights
corresponding to those guaranteed by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Article 7 of the Charter
must therefore be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the
ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the [ECtHR] . .. ."); see also supra notes 101-04
and accompanying text (discussing the Charter's relationship to the ECHR).
196. SeejMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_, 53-54 (adopting the ECtHR's interpretation
of ECHR Article 8 as the interpretation of Charter Article 7).
197. Id. 1 54 (referring to Guichard and reiterating the facts and holding); see supra
notes 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing Guichard); see also supra notes 168-69
and accompanying text (discussing the Irish High Court's application of Guichard).
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The Court concluded that providing an application process
for the unmarried father of a child to gain custody rights was
adequate protection of a natural father's right to private and
family life.198 In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Justice
reiterated that the Charter only applies when EU law is at issue.'99
The Court definitively stated that domestic law is not to be
assessed according to the Charter.200
The Court further noted three major problems with holding
that the Charter forces a Member State to recognize rights of
custody under Brussels II bis, regardless of whether the father
had rights of custody under national law.20 1 First, it would
infringe upon the mother's right of free movement, an outcome
that the Charter itself prohibits. 202 Second, such a holding would
be "incompatible with the requirements of legal certainty." 203
The Court of justice, however, does not detail the specific issues
of legal certainty with which it is concerned. 204 Third, the Court
of justice states that such a holding might violate Article 51(2) of
198. JMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I-, 55 (stating that Member States providing for an
application process was the "very essence of the right of a natural father to a private and
family life").
199. See id. 51 ("[The Charter's] provisions are addressed to the Member States
only when they are implementing European Union law.").
200. See id. 52 (" [T]he Charter should be taken into consideration solely for the
purposes of interpreting [Brussels II bis], and there should be no assessment of national
law as such.").
201. See id. 59 ("[T]o admit the possibility that a natural father has rights of
custody in respect of his child, under [Brussels II bis] notwithstanding that no such
rights are accorded to him under national law, would be incompatible with the
requirements of legal certainty . . . .").
202, Id. 1 58 (explaining that, under the treaties of the EU, a mother has rights of
free movement that would be abridged if a father who had not applied for custody rights
could prevent her from moving with their child); see also Charter of Rights, supra note
18, art. 45(1), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 400 ("Every citizen of the Union has the right to move
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.").
203. SeeJMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I-, 58 (noting that the mother's Charter Article
52(1) rights to free movement would be infringed by finding that Brussels II bis granted
automatic rights of custody to fathers who are not married to the mothers of their
children); see also Charter of Rights, supra note 18, art. 52(1), 2010 0.J. C 83, at 402
("Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.").
204. JMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_, 1 58 (limiting its discussion to merely mentioning
"legal certainty").
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the Charter, which states that the Charter does not extend or
change the EU's powers. 205
In addition to asking whether Article 7 of the Charter
prohibited a Member State from requiring a father to apply for
rights of custody before he could qualify as having them under
Brussels II bis, the Irish Supreme Court asked if any of the EU
provisions prohibited such a requirement.206 The Court ofJustice
thus addressed the question of whether Article 24 of the Charter,
"the rights of the child," prohibited requiring the father to apply
for rights. 2 0 7 The Court noted that there was a "great variety of
extra-marital relationships and consequent parent-child
relationships" throughout the EU. 208 This variety, the Court
reasoned, did not specifically warrant extending automatic rights
of custody to unmarried fathers.209 According to the Court,
forcing unmarried fathers to apply for rights allowed the courts
of Member States with jurisdiction over the custody matter to
take account for the specific factual circumstances of the parents'
relationship with each other and with the child.210 The Court,
therefore, held that Article 24 of the Charter does not prohibit a
Member State from requiring the father to apply for rights of
custody before he can qualify as having them under Brussels II
bis.211
III. EFFECTS OF THE COURT OFJUSTICE'S OPINION
The Court of Justice's decision will influence both the lives
of J.McB.'s family and the legal landscape of Brussels II bis, the
Hague Convention, and European human rights. This Part
205. Id. ("Such an outcome might, moreover, infringe Article 51(2) of the
Charter."); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (quoting the text of Article
51(2)).
206. See supra note 175 (quoting the Supreme Court of Ireland's question for the
Court ofJustice).
207. See jMcB., [2010] E.C.R. I_ 60-63 (discussing whether Article 24 of the
Charter prohibits requiring an unmarried father to apply for rights of custody); see also
Charter of Rights, supra notel8, art. 24(1), 2010 0.J. C 364, at 396 ("Children shall have
the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may
express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which
concern them in accordance with their age and maturity.").





1464 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1430
considers the effects of fMcB. v. L.E. Section A comments on the
intricacies of Irish law that facilitated this case reaching the Court
of Justice. Section B analyzes what will likely happen in J.McB.'s
search for custody rights of his three children and suggests that
J.McB will continue to have a relationship with his children.
Section C assesses the legal implications of the opinion on
Brussels II bis and potential changes in Hague Abduction
Convention jurisprudence generally. Section C concludes that
the definition of custody in both the Convention and the
Regulation should be coextensive. Finally, Section D considers
the opinion's impact on European human rights law, noting that
the decision will have both positive and negative impacts on
human rights jurisprudence.
A. Irish Domestic Law
Brussels II bis creates complications for the courts of
Member States by grafting itself onto the Hague Abduction
Convention because it makes an underlying, widely accepted
international treaty the base for an EU law.2 12 The latter cannot
properly function without the former.213 The courts of the
Member States have the unenviable job of sorting out when and
how the Regulation supersedes the Convention.214
As this Comment demonstrates, this sorting proved a
labyrinthine task for the Irish courts and Justice Mac Menamin's
finding that he was not confined to a traditional Article 15 Hague
Abduction Convention analysis had implications in EU law
because it led the Court ofJustice to issue an opinion on Brussels
II bis.215 If Justice Mac Menamin had found the other way (i.e.,
that he was confined to a traditional Article 15 Hague Abduction
Convention analysis), the English court's authority to handle the
question of custody would have easily been established.216 As
212. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between the Hague Abduction Convention and Brussels II bis).
213. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (noting that the Hague Abduction
Convention is still effective between Member States).
214. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Mac
Menamin's analysis on this point).
215. See supra notes 134-44 (explaining how the one determination caused the
Court ofJustice to hear a case).
216. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining custody rights under
Irish law and reiterating that the Irish courts foundJ.McB. had none).
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already noted, L.E.'s removal of the children was not wrongful
under the Hague Abduction Convention.217 Therefore, if Justice
Mac Menamin had decided the other way, Brussels II bis would
never have come into play, and this case would never have
required certification to the Court of Justice. Justice Mac
Menamin's finding seems a bit odd because one Irish Minister,
who was appointed by the president on the recommendation of
the Taoiseach (the Irish prime minister), created Statutory
Instrument 112/2005, which ultimately required the Irish
Supreme Court to certify a question to the Court of Justice.218
The process seems undemocratic for two reasons. First, the
minister is appointed, not elected.219 Because this question gets
certified to the Court of Justice and the Court issued an opinion
that is binding on all Member States, the minister makes rules
that ultimately affect the application of EU law throughout the
EU.220 Second, the minister's law-making capabilities seem
unchecked; neither the Irish High Court nor Irish Supreme
Court explicitly considered whether Statutory Instrument
112/2005 is a prudent law. 221 It may very well be that both courts
approved of Statutory Instrument 112/2005, but there is a lack of
discussion on the subject in the opinions of both courts.222
217. See supra note 173 (quoting the Irish Supreme Court's affirmation of the High
Court's determination that L.E.'s removal of the children was not wrongful within the
meaning of the Hague Abduction Convention).
218. See supra notes 134-44 (explaining howJustice Mac Menamin's determination
that Statutory Instrument 112/2005 triggered Brussels II bis, as opposed to determining
that he was confined to traditional Article 15 Hague Abduction Convention analysis,
lead to the Court of Justice hearing a case).
219. See supra note 82 (noting that the Irish Constitution grants the Irish president
the power to appoint ministers). This power would include appointing the Minister for
Justice, Equality and Law Reform who was responsible for promulgating the Statutory
Instrument 112/2005. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 157 (noting that the Court of Justice's opinions are binding
precedent in all Member States).
221. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Mac
Menamin's reasoning); supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme
Court of Ireland affirmed Justice Mac Menamin's analysis).
222. The Irish Supreme Court has not issued an opinion on the case since the
Court ofJustice opined, therefore this issue may yet be addressed.
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B. The Immediate Effect of the Court offustice's Decision onjMcB.
The Supreme Court of Ireland is bound by the opinion of
the Court of Justice.223 It will, with all likelihood, rule that
J.McB.'s children were not wrongfully removed because the
Court of Justice did not preclude Ireland from requiring J.McB.
to have applied for custody rights.2 24 The case will then be sent
back to the English Court, which will refuse to return the
children to Ireland because the Irish courts did not find that L.E.
wrongfully removed them.22 5 J.McB. will therefore have to apply
to the English courts for guardianship, custody, or access under
English law because, under the Hague Convention and the
Regulation, the children are habitually resident in England.226
One of the great ironies of this case is that J.McB. may have an
easier time procuring custody rights in England than in Ireland,
as England, unlike Ireland, does not have the prohibition on
automatic rights for fathers who are not married to the mothers
of their children.227
C. Impact of the Court ofJustice Ruling on the Brussels II bis and the
Hague Convention
Arguably the most important pronouncement in the Court
of Justice opinion is that Brussels II bis does not interfere with
substantive laws of the Member States. The Court of Justice
strongly stressed that the Charter is only applicable to Brussels II
bis and not to Irish domestic law, even though this particular
question goes right to the line between procedural EU law and
substantive national law. 2 8 Thus, any argument that substantive
custody rights should be decided at the supranational level is
223. See supra note 157 (noting that Court ofJustice opinions are binding).
224. See supra notes 195-01 and accompanying text (reiterating the Court of
Justice's holding that EU law, specifically the Charter, does not compel Ireland to
recognize automatic rights of custody for a father who is not married to the mother of
his child for purposes of Brussels II bis).
225. See supra note 133 (explaining what would happen if the Irish courts declared
thatJ.McB. did not have rights of custody to his children).
226. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (quoting justice Mac Menamin's
conclusion that England should decide the issue of custody rights).
227. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (quoting the English statute on
child custody).
228. See supra note 201-202 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of
Justice's opinion on this point).
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foreclosed.229 Because the Court of Justice firmly establishes that
the EU is not going to interfere with substantive domestic family
law, this case has the potential to be an important precedent. It
delineates issues that are within the purview of the Member
States and those that are within the Court ofJustice's purview.
The secondary fallout of this case involves its indirect impact
on Hague Convention jurisprudence because the question
whether Hague Abduction Convention applications will have
different outcomes between Member States than as between non-
Member States or a Member State and a non-Member State
remains open.230 Article 2 of Brussels II bis adds the term "and
duties" to the Convention's Article 3 definition of "custody
rights."23' The addition could become problematic in
international law. For example, if Brussels II bis defines custody
rights uniquely from the Hague Abduction Convention, there
would be a lack of uniformity in Convention analysis.232 To
clarify, a parent who meets the definition of "custody rights"
under Brussels II bis would be able to compel her child's return
if the abductor took the child to a Member State. But, if this
same parent does not meet the definition of "custody rights"
under the Hague Abduction Convention, and the abductor went
to a non-Member State, the parent would not be able to compel
the child's return.
When a Member State is faced with the problem the Irish
courts faced-that a domestic law brought the Hague Abduction
Convention and the Brussels II bis into conflict-the
jurisprudence on the resolution of that conflict could follow
three possible paths.233 Each Member State faced with such a
conflict will make its own choice between paths because there is
no supranational court that can unify the law for the Hague
229. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (noting that the Court of Justice
declined to discuss rights of custody under national law).
230. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (outlining L.E.'s argument on
this point).
231. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (comparing the definitions).
232. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (noting that L.E. foresaw problems
with such an interpretation).
233. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (summarizing the interplay of
Irish national law, Brussels II bis, and the Hague Abduction Convention).
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Abduction Convention.23 4 First, the Member States could accept
the interpretation that Hague Abduction Convention analysis is
different if the child was removed to a non-Member State than if
the child was removed to a Member State.235 This is a dangerous
solution because it could result in abductors "shopping" for a
state that is not within the EU in order to take advantage of the
Hague Abduction Convention's narrower definition of "custody
rights," thereby preventing the other parent from compelling the
child's return.23 6
Justice Mac Menamin proposed an alternative for resolving
the disparity in definitions between the Hague Abduction
Convention and Brussels II bis. Member States could apply
Brussels II bis definitions regardless of where the abductor took
the child.2 37 This option is also problematic, however, because
Brussels 11 bis would essentially override the Hague Abduction
Convention when a Member State is involved in a Convention
application, which could be a major break from Convention
jurisprudence.
Finally, as L.E. submitted to the Irish courts, Brussels II bis
and the Hague Abduction Convention could be interpreted as
having co-extensive definitions.238 In other words, the Member
States could use their Convention jurisprudence to define the
scope of the Regulation. The Regulation can apply as intended
between Member States, and a radical change in Hague
Abduction Convention jurisprudence is prevented. Additionally,
this solution leaves open the possibility for the most logical
solution: a revision of the Hague Abduction Convention itself.23 9
234. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that the Hague Abduction
Convention deliberately sought to avoid this problem by writing a procedural
convention that allows contracting states to apply their own substantive law).
235. See supra note 140-143 and accompanying text (explaining justice Mac
Menamin's reasoning).
236. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative).
238. See supra note 156 (outlining her argument).
239. See H.I. v. M.G., [2000] I.R. 110, 133 (Ir.) (stating that judicial opinions are
not the place for inventing legal solutions to problems with the Hague Abduction
Convention).
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D. Impact on European Human Rights Law
The important human rights conclusion in the Court of
Justice's decision is that the Court remains unwilling to expand
the meaning of "respect for private and family life" beyond that
accorded by the ECtHR.20 The positive consequence of the
holding is that it continued the trend of deferring to the ECtHR,
thereby reducing the opportunity for divergent interpretations
between the ECHR and the Charter.241 A negative consequence is
that the decision continues the family law jurisprudential focus
on the heterosexual marital family as the source of rights.242
Additionally, the Court of Justice offered only weak justifications
for declining to extend the protections to nontraditional
families, citing the mother's right to exercise her rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter as the primary
justification. 243
If the Court ofJustice had extended rights to the father, the
mother's freedom of movement would indeed have been
infringed. The mother would be able to unilaterally move the
child within the Member State so long as the move was consistent
with domestic law, but not to another Member State because
Brussels II bis would accord rights of custody to the father that
would prevent such a move. 244 The Court of Justice's analysis of
Article 7, therefore, is sound. Unfortunately, however, the Court
of Justice has thus taken the position that restricting a mother's
movement with one Member State is inappropriate, even when it
would help children stay in contact with both parents.
240. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (observing that the Court of
Justice did not extend automatic rights of custody to unmarried fathers).
241. See supra notes 98-04 and accompanying text (explaining the potential for
differing interpretations of the human rights protections found both in the ECHR and
the Charter due to the parallel nature of the ECtHR's and Court of Justice's
jurisdiction).
242. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (explaining that the ECtHR
continues to base relief in relationships that resemble traditional marriages).
243. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court of
Justice's justifications).
244. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that Brussels II bis applies
when two Member States are involved); see supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text
(noting that the Court ofJustice will not interfere with substantive domestic law).
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The Court's analysis of Article 24 of the Charter leaves itself
open to further criticism. 245 Considering that the Charter,
Brussels II bis, and the Hague Abduction Convention all affirm
the primacy of the child's interest, it seems like the child's right
to have family life with both parents should trump the mother's
right to free movement. 246 While it is not always in the interest of
the child to be raised by both parents, the Court of Justice's
opinion prevents a court from considering what is actually in the
interests of the child. This, however, was not how the Court of
Justice viewed the situation. 247 The Court of Justice opined that
the complicated nature of extra-marital relationships and the
relationships with the resulting children are best dealt with by the
Member State court with jurisdiction over the custody matters.248
Simply because it is rational for the court handling the actual
custody proceeding to consider factors such as the parents'
relationship to the child and aptitude for parenting does not
necessarily mean that these considerations should not play a role
in determining whether the father has inchoate rights of custody
under Brussels II bis. If these factors are relevant for one
consideration of custody rights, they should be relevant for all
considerations. It is illogical to deny a father who has been
directly involved in raising his child input over which country the
child lives in merely because he never made an application to the
court in his state, but this is precisely the result of the Court of
Justice's opinion.
Additionally, declaring that Brussels II bis does recognize
inchoate rights of custody would require the Court of Justice to
hear more cases. Because the Court is responsible for the
ultimate interpretation of EU laws, it would have to determine
245. See supra notes 207-11 (summarizing the Court of Justice's conclusion that
requiring an unmarried father to apply for rights of custody before he can qualify as
having them under Brussels II bis does not violate Article 24 of the Charter).
246. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (referencing the portion of both
documents that identifies the child's interest as the primary concern). As further
justification, the Court ofJustice vaguely implied that there would be issues of "legal
certainty" and that recognizing an unmarried father's right of custody might establish or
modify the EU's powers. See supra notes 203-06 (quoting the Court ofJustice's statement
on this concern). Without the Court ofJustice specifically articulating its concern, it is
impossible to analyze the prudence of these justifications without speculation.
247. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (restating the Court of Justice's
conclusion that Article 24 was not violated).
248. See supra note 211 (listing the factors the Court of Justice found to be best
considered by the Member State court with jurisdiction over the issue of custody).
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exactly where the line is between a father whose relationship with
his child was close enough to establish inchoate rights of custody
and a father whose relationship was not close enough.249 In short,
the Court of Justice seems to have based its decision on
reluctance to generate an increased caseload and a disinclination
to appear to be interfering with substantive domestic law, rather
than protecting familial relationships or the interests of the child
as Brussels II bis and the Charter require.
CONCLUSION
While J.McB. will, in all legal likelihood, continue to have a
relationship with his children, the Court of Justice's opinion
leaves the family law field with mixed results. On the one hand,
the Court of Justice provided beneficial clarification of Brussels II
bis by interpreting it as an autonomous code. Additionally, the
interpretation results in a closer connection between the ECtHR
and the Court ofJustice. By deferring to the ECtHR, the Court of
Justice prevented divergent interpretations of Article 8 of the
ECHR and Article 7 of the Charter.
On the other hand, however, the opinion left uncertain the
status of the Hague Convention within Europe. Further, the
Court of Justice missed an opportunity to extend human rights
protections to nontraditional, non-marital families. There was
great potential to move the jurisprudence on the rights of
unmarried fathers beyond the existing precedents because the
Lisbon Treaty made the Charter binding, thereby creating a
logical justification for shifting the interpretation of Article 7. A
father who is not married to the mother of his children, however,
remains without the automatic rights granted to married fathers.
249. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting the Court of Justice's
jurisdiction).
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